Colombia
Fugro assessing seabed conditions for deepwater Sirius gas development offshore
Jeremy Beckman March 9, 2026
The subsea infrastructure survey is one of various new oil and gas and wind projects the company is supporting globally.
In 2023, Blue Essence was the first USV to receive approval from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to operate fully remotely with an eROV and undertake surveys in UK waters.
Fugro has detailed its current and recent investigative programs at offshore oil and gas field and wind farm locations. Offshore the Americas, the company conducted geotechnical site investigations, laboratory testing and analysis for Petrobras at the deepwater Sirius gas field in the Caribbean Sea offshore Colombia to support subsea infrastructure planning.
In the US Gulf of Mexico, Fugro has been performing continued metocean buoy mooring, maintenance and data services for Shell Energy North America at the Stones Field. The company has undertaken nearshore and shallow-water site investigations for the Rio de Janeiro Offshore Wind Pilot Project, also for Petrobras.
Wind activity in Europe included a metocean and wind measurement campaign for BHS in Germany, with SEAWATCH lidar buoys deployed at sites in the North Sea EEZ offshore wind hub. In the Middle East & India, Fugro conducted nearshore and offshore site investigations for Subsea7 to optimize engineering design, assess seabed risks and strengthen installation planning for a large-scale oil and gas development offshore Saudi Arabia; ROV- based inspection and intervention services to support QCON with the shutdown of subsea infrastructure offshore Qatar; and pre-lay surveys for the OMV Petrom-operated Neptune Deep natural gas pipeline in the Black Sea offshore Romania.
Fugro’s program in the Bass Strait offshore Australia has covered inspection, maintenance and repair services, including pipeline inspection, with the Blue Essence USV for multiple clients. The company observes initial signs of a recovery in offshore wind development in Europe with increased tendering activity.
While there is no sign of new wind projects offshore the US, the sector is gaining momentum offshore Latin America and Canada. In offshore oil and gas, companies expanding their portfolios through targeted exploration, with a focus on tight timelines and cost efficiency.
Colombia:
Arrow Exploration results from Llanos Basin
2 March 2026
Arrow Exploration, the high-growth operator with a portfolio of assets across key hydrocarbon basins, provided an update on Mateguafa Attic field on the Tapir Block in the Llanos Basin where Arrow holds a 50 percent beneficial interest.
Mateguafa 10 well Spud on February 11, M-10 reached target depth on February 18. M-10 was drilled on time and under budget to a total measured depth of 10,930 MD feet (9,294 feet true vertical depth), encountering multiple hydrocarbon-bearing intervals.
Arrow put the well on production February 24 in the Carbonera C7 formation, with 20 feet of net oil pay (true vertical depth) at this location. The pay zone is a clean sandstone exhibiting an average porosity of 20% with high resistivities.
An electric submersible pump (ESP) was inserted in the well after perforating. The well also encountered 25 feet of net oil pay (true vertical depth) in the Carbonera C9 formation which Arrow plans to test in future. The well was put on production at a heavily restricted rate, 25/128 choke and 30 Hz pump frequency, of approximately 1,100 BOPD gross (550 BOPD net). Oil quality is 31° API with a 6% water cut (completion fluid and formation water).
Testing results indicate the well is capable of higher rates and the ultimate flow rate will be determined in the first few weeks of production. Initial production results are not necessarily indicative of long-term performance or ultimate recovery.
Mateguafa 9HZ well Spud on January 21, M-9HZ well reached target depth on February 7. M-9HZ was drilled on time and on budget, to a total measured depth of 15,025 MD feet (8,427 feet true vertical depth) and encountered multiple hydrocarbon-bearing intervals, including the Gacheta, the C9 and the C7. Arrow put the well on production on February 10 in the C9 formation, with 5,025 feet of horizontal oil-bearing section.
M-9HZ is the longest horizontal well Arrow drilled in Colombia. The pay zone is a clean sandstone exhibiting average porosity of 23% with high resistivities. An ESP was inserted in the well after perforating. The well was put on production at a restricted rate, 31/128 choke and 38 Hz pump frequency, of approximately 850 BOPD gross (425 BOPD net).
Oil quality is 31° API with a 16% water cut (completion fluid and formation water). Arrow is increasing the pump frequency to encourage oil production from the toe section of the well. Testing results indicate the well is capable of higher rates and the ultimate flow rate will be determined in the first few weeks of production. Initial production results are not necessarily indicative of long-term performance or ultimate recovery.
Mateguafa 8 well The decision was to convert M-8 well into a water disposal well. The Mateguafa pad will require water disposal facilities to keep operating costs down and the M-8 well is an excellent candidate for water disposal. The well discontinued production and the rig was moved to the M-8 location to begin recompletion, expected to take a week. Regulatory approval is expected to take another 6 weeks. The water disposal well will then begin operations when required.
Mateguafa HZ7 well M-HZ7 reached target depth on December 4, 2025 and continues to produce strongly from the C9 formation with production of 1,250 BOPD gross (625 BOPD net) with an 11% water cut. The well experienced very low decline rates during this initial production phase.
Mateguafa 6 well Production from M-6 is approximately 410 BOPD gross (205 BOPD net) with a 40% water cut. The M-6 well is producing from the C7 formation.
Mateguafa 5 well M-5 is producing at a current rate of 676 BOPD gross (338 BOPD net) with a 71% water cut. The M-5 well is producing from the C9 formation.
Forward Drilling Plans After the Mateguafa 8 recompletion, the Company plans to move the rig to the Mateguafa 11 (M-11) location, which will be a vertical well with both C7 and C9 targets. After M-11 the rig will move to the newly completed Icaco pad to drill an exploration well, which is expected to spud in April.
Production Including the restricted production from the M-9HZ and M-10 wells, total corporate production is approximately 4,900 boe/d. The CN-7 well remains shut in due to pump failure. When shut in the well was producing 250 BOPD gross (125 BOPD net).
Cash Balance On February 1, cash balance was US$7.2 million. This reflects increased activity drilling wells on the Mateguafa pad, completing the Icaco pad and initiating operating costs savings projects in the field. The Company continues to have no debt.
Tapir Extension: Arrow and its partner in the Tapir block remain in discussions with authorities on the extension of the Tapir block. To date the dialog has been very constructive. Arrow is confident that all conditions required for the extension to be granted have been met and management remains very confident that the extension will be granted. The Company will continue to update the market on developments as they occur.
Marshall Abbott, CEO of Arrow commented: ‘The success of the M-9HZ and M-10 wells reinforce the materiality of the Mateguafa field to Arrow. The initial discovery and development of Mateguafa demonstrate the resource-rich potential of the Tapir block and the experience of the professional team at Arrow to quickly unlock that potential.
The initial development wells drilled at Mateguafa continue to produce at considerable rates with low decline, with significant further pay seen in formations to which Arrow plans to return at a later date. After drilling and putting the M-11 well on production,
Arrow plans to move the rig to the newly finished Icaco pad. The Icaco prospect has been developed by the Arrow team using both 2D seismic and later the more recently shot 3D seismic program. Management believes the Icaco prospect will also result in a material discovery for Arrow.
We look forward to updating our shareholders on the progress at Icaco over the coming months.’
Source: Arrow Exploration
Frontera proceeds with $525 million Parex bid for Colombian E&P assets
March 10, 2026
( Frontera Energy Corp. plans to move forward with a $525-million offer from Parex Resources Inc. for its Colombian upstream assets after GeoPark Ltd. declined to match the revised bid.)
Frontera received formal notice from GeoPark that the company would not exercise its contractual right to match the Parex proposal, which Frontera’s board had previously determined constituted a “superior proposal.”
The decision clears the way for Frontera to terminate its existing arrangement with GeoPark and enter into definitive agreements with Parex to complete the transaction through a plan of arrangement under British Columbia corporate law.
Under the proposed deal, Parex would acquire Frontera’s Colombian exploration and production business for $500 million in cash plus an additional $25 million contingent payment tied to development milestones.
Parex would also assume certain debt obligations tied to the assets. GeoPark said its board concluded that increasing its bid would not align with the company’s disciplined capital allocation strategy. The company determined that raising its offer would weaken expected returns and reduce financial flexibility compared with alternative investment opportunities within its portfolio.
As part of the termination of the previous agreement, GeoPark will receive the return of $75 million previously placed in escrow, along with interest, and a $25 million breakup fee from Frontera. GeoPark said it will instead focus on optimizing production from its Colombian assets, particularly the Llanos 34 block, while advancing growth projects in Argentina’s Vaca Muerta shale play.
Colombia:
Frontera decides Parex offer surpasses Geopark transaction
7 March 2026
Frontera Energy announced that its Board of Directors, in consultation with its external legal counsel and independent financial advisors, determined that the binding offer received from Parex Resources to acquire all of Frontera’s upstream Colombian exploration and production business constitutes a ‘Superior Proposal’ (as defined in the GeoPark Arrangement Agreement described below).
Under the Parex Offer, Parex would acquire the same assets that Frontera agreed to sell to a subsidiary of GeoPark under the previously announced arrangement agreement between Frontera and GeoPark dated January 29, 2026 (the ‘GeoPark Arrangement Agreement’).
The purchase price under the Parex Offer consists of (a) US$500,000,000 in cash payable upon closing; plus, as is the case with the GeoPark transaction (b) an additional US$25,000,000 contingent payment payable upon the achievement of specified development milestones within a period of up to 12 months following the transaction closing date, and (c) the assumption of all of Frontera’s obligations under the US$310,000,000 aggregate principal amount of outstanding 2028 Frontera Unsecured Notes and the US$80,000,000 outstanding under Frontera’s previously announced prepayment facility with Chevron Products Company.
The consideration offered in the Parex Offer also assumes the payment of US$25,000,000 Purchaser Break Fee payable to GeoPark by Frontera should Frontera terminate the GeoPark Arrangement Agreement. Except for the consideration being offered, the arrangement agreement that would be entered into with Parex is substantially the same as the GeoPark Arrangement Agreement, and the transaction structure is the same as for the GeoPark transaction.
Frontera has advised GeoPark of this determination, and the five Business Day period (the “Matching Period”) in which, GeoPark has the right, but not the obligation, to amend the terms of the GeoPark Arrangement Agreement in order for the Parex Offer to cease to be a Superior Proposal has commenced (the ‘Match Right’). The Matching Period will expire at 11:59 p.m. (Eastern time) on March 12, 2026.
At this time, there can be no assurance that the Parex Offer will result in a transaction or that any transaction contemplated thereby will be completed. The GeoPark Arrangement Agreement remains in effect, and the Frontera Board of Directors continues to act in accordance with its fiduciary duties and the terms of the GeoPark Arrangement Agreement.
The Frontera Board of Directors has not changed its recommendation regarding the transaction with GeoPark pursuant to the GeoPark Arrangement Agreement. Frontera will provide updates, including with respect to the determination by GeoPark as to whether or not to exercise its Match Right, as required under applicable securities laws.
Frontera Energy Corporation is a Canadian public company involved in the exploration, development, production, transportation, storage and sale of oil and natural gas in South America, including related investments in both upstream and midstream facilities. The Company has a diversified portfolio of assets with interests in 18 exploration and production blocks in Colombia and Guyana, and pipeline and port facilities in Colombia. Frontera is committed to conducting business safely and in a socially, environmentally and ethically responsible manner. Source: Frontera Energy
Frontera updates proposal from Parex Resources
3 March 2026
Frontera Energy provided an update on the previously-announced unsolicited, non-binding proposal made by Parex Resources to acquire all of Frontera’s upstream Colombian exploration and production business, being the same assets that Frontera agreed to sell to a subsidiary of GeoPark under the previously announced arrangement agreement between Frontera and GeoPark dated January 29, 2026.
Since receipt of the non-binding proposal, consistent with its fiduciary responsibilities, the Frontera Board of Directors, in consultation with its outside legal counsel and independent financial advisors, has carefully reviewed and considered the Parex non-binding proposal and has had ongoing discussions and negotiations with Parex, including providing it with certain non-public information regarding Frontera pursuant to a confidentiality agreement.
Today, Frontera received a binding proposal from Parex to acquire the equity interest of the Frontera E&P Assets for $525 million, and is currently awaiting confirmation of certain terms.
As a result, the Frontera Board of Directors, in consultation with outside legal counsel and its independent financial advisors, has determined that the Parex Binding Proposal at this time does not constitute a ‘Superior Proposal’, as defined under the GeoPark Arrangement Agreement.
The GeoPark Arrangement Agreement remains in full force and effect, and the Frontera Board of Directors continues to recommend the GeoPark arrangement to the Frontera shareholders and that Frontera shareholders vote in favor of the resolution to approve the GeoPark arrangement at the upcoming special meeting of shareholders on April 10, 2026.
Source: Frontera Resources
GeoPark declines to raise offer for Frontera Energy’s Colombia assets
10 Mar 2026
Reaffirms Capital Discipline, Strategic Focus and Preserved Flexibility for Long-Term Growth
GeoPark, a leading independent energy company with over 20 years of successful operations across Latin America, today announced that it has declined to raise its offer for Frontera Energy’s Colombian E&P assets.
After careful evaluation, GeoPark’s Board of Directors determined that increasing its offer would not be consistent with the Company’s disciplined capital allocation framework or long-term value maximization objectives. At the revised valuation, the transaction base case would likely deteriorate portfolio-level return expectations, reduce resilience under lower oil price scenarios, and compare unfavorably against alternative capital deployment opportunities across its existing portfolio and emerging prospects.
The Board concluded that preserving financial flexibility and allocating capital only to opportunities that are best positioned to maximize long-term shareholder value remains a core principle to the Company’s strategy.
Reinforced Platform and Clear Execution Roadmap
GeoPark pursued the Frontera transaction following nearly a year of detailed technical, financial and strategic analysis. The Company had conviction in the operational fit and long-term potential of the assets at the agreed price.
Frontera subsequently notified GeoPark that its Board of Directors had determined Parex Resources Inc.’s proposal constituted a “Superior Proposal” under the terms of the existing arrangement agreement, thereby initiating the contractual matching period. GeoPark carefully evaluated its rights and obligations during that period, including a reassessment of the transaction economics under the revised terms.
However, at the revised offer level, the Board concluded that an increased price would not meet GeoPark’s expected risk-adjusted return thresholds. GeoPark emerges from this process stronger, preserving the balance sheet resilience and portfolio flexibility that underpin its strategy, more focused and well capitalized for its next phase of growth.
Over the past year, the Company has:
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- Increased scale and diversified its portfolio;
- Delivered production above guidance;
- Reduced breakevens;
- Strengthened its balance sheet; and
- Secured long-term aligned institutional backing through strategic investment by Grupo Gilinski.
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GeoPark’s strategy remains intact:
Protecting and Maximizing Core Production and Cash Generation in Colombia
The Company continues to optimize and enhance performance at its flagship Llanos 34 block and across its operated and non-operated portfolio. Recent developments have accelerated the inflection point in Colombian production earlier than expected.
A recently certified 22% increase in 2P Original Oil in Place in Llanos 34 confirms a significantly larger resource base, strengthening the long-term production and economic outlook of the asset. Colombia will continue to generate sustainable free cash flow, underpin balance sheet strength, and support disciplined growth.
Scaling Growth in Vaca Muerta, Argentina
Following the successful integration of Loma Jarillosa Este and Puesto Silva Oeste, GeoPark is advancing its unconventional platform in the Neuquén Basin. The Company is focused on accelerating drilling activity to deliver a step-change in production and cash flow.
Vaca Muerta is expected to become a core growth engine by 2028. At expected peak production of approximately 20,000 boepd gross in 2028, these assets are projected to contribute approximately US$300–350 million of gross Adjusted EBITDA at a US$70/bbl Brent oil price, providing scalable, long-life production supported by disciplined capital deployment.1
Strategic Optionality Preserved
By choosing not to increase its offer, GeoPark preserves capital flexibility to pursue alternative value-accretive opportunities across Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela and the broader region.
The Company remains committed to becoming the leading independent oil and gas platform in Latin America through disciplined organic and inorganic growth, supported by scale, resilience, technical excellence and strong governance. GeoPark will continue to evaluate opportunities that align with its strategy, meet return criteria and enhance long-term shareholder value.
CEO Commentary
Felipe Bayon, Chief Executive Officer of GeoPark, said: “GeoPark’s Board of Directors takes seriously its responsibility to be good stewards of shareholder value, and our decision not to increase our offer for Frontera’s assets reflects our commitment to a highly disciplined approach to capital allocation.
GeoPark evaluates every investment opportunity against strict financial, strategic and risk-adjusted criteria. At the revised terms, increasing our offer would not represent the best use of capital relative to the opportunities within our existing portfolio and pipeline.
We remain fully committed to executing our two-fold strategy: maximizing our Colombian platform and scaling Vaca Muerta as a core growth engine. With a strengthened balance sheet, aligned long-term capital and preserved flexibility, GeoPark is well positioned to pursue disciplined growth and deliver sustainable long-term value.”
Transaction Settlement
Under the terms of its agreement with Frontera, GeoPark will receive the return of $75 million previously placed in escrow plus interest and will be entitled to a $25 million breakup fee.
Advisors
BTG Pactual acted as exclusive M&A financial advisor to GeoPark in the transaction, while Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Bennett Jones, and CMS Rodríguez-Azuero served as legal counsels and FGS Global served as strategic communications advisor.
IMF:
U.S. 2026 Article IV Consultation Mission
February 25, 2026
Speakers:
- Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, IMF
- Nigel Chalk, Director, Western Hemisphere Department, IMF
Moderator:
Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, IMF
* * * * *
MS. KOZACK: Good afternoon, everyone. This is our press conference for the U.S. Article IV Consultation for 2026. We hope you had a chance to review the concluding statement, which was placed under embargo. I am delighted to be here with our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our U.S. Mission Chief, Nigel Chalk. What we’ll do today is we will start with Kristalina. She will share with you, through opening remarks, her takeaways from her meetings that concluded earlier today, and then we’ll have time for some questions.
We have 30 minutes for this press briefing, and I will now turn to Kristalina for her opening remarks.
MS. GEORGIEVA: Thank you very much.
We have held meetings with Secretary Bessent and Chair Powell today. Very good meetings, very substantive. And I want to start by expressing our gratitude to the leadership and staff of the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other agencies for multiple discussions they have had with our team over the past several weeks. Secretary Bessent particularly underscored the value he places on frank, candid, and even-handed surveillance by the IMF.
In our concluding statement, we note that U.S. policymakers have embarked on a systemic reorientation of the U.S. economy to boost the living standards of the American workers. The administration aims to do so by increasing economic self-reliance, supporting domestic manufacturing, reducing the trade deficit and reliance on foreign-produced goods, investing in domestic energy output, securing the border, and scaling back the federal government’s role in the economy.
Our consultation for 2026 focuses on the macroeconomic effects of this important shift in policies, and on that, I would like to make four points. First, we expect that a buoyant U.S. economy will continue to grow strongly throughout this and next year. In 2025, growth reached 2.2 percent on a fourth quarter to fourth quarter basis, and this is close to our January 25th projection, despite significant swings in trade during the year and a sizable drag from the government shutdown in the fourth quarter. Unemployment has remained relatively low, the rate of participation in the labor force by prime-age workers has been rising, and real incomes have been increasing — and this is so good news.
Undoubtedly, the story of 2025 has been the remarkable performance of U.S. private sector entrepreneurs and workers. The level of innovation, adaptability, and resilience has been impressive. The U.S. sits solidly at the frontier globally in terms of dynamism, know-how, and technology, and this has been most clear in the strength of labor productivity. It has helped to support growth in the United States and also to create positive spillovers to the global economy.
And there is an upside risk that technology, investment inflows, and the administration’s focus on reducing red tape will bear fruit, and they would support greater economic dynamism and growth. At this stage, it is difficult to quantify the potential of this impact, so we will have to continue to monitor these factors and how they impact growth in the United States carefully.
So, what do we expect? We expect the economy to accelerate somewhat in 2026, growing at a healthy 2.4 percent on a fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter basis and to continue in a similar pace into 2027. We also expect the unemployment rate to fall somewhat to around 4 percent.
Finally, inflation has remained around 3 percent throughout 2025, although services inflation has been steadily falling. Goods inflation has been somewhat affected by tariffs, but we expect that to wane and for inflation to return to the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent target by early 2027. Given this inflation outlook, we believe it was appropriate for the Fed to cut interest rates during 2025 and to return monetary policy to broadly neutral settings.
Second, we see the near-term risks to activity, unemployment, and inflation as broadly balanced. The Fed has been calibrating policy well to the balance of risk between inflation pressures and slowing job growth. Under staff’s baseline outlook, bringing down the federal funds rate modestly to between 3.25 and 3.5 percent by end 2026 will be consistent with an economic economy returning to full employment and inflation setting around the 2 percent target.
A larger monetary easing than the one I described would need to be based on a material worsening in the outlook for the labor market. This is not in our baseline, but we recognize it is nonetheless. Of course, what I’m telling you is just a forecast. Much could change in the coming months. We know that we operate in an environment of higher uncertainty, and as a result, the Fed will need to be attentive to incoming information and should continue to communicate their evolving views clearly to the public.
Third, the continuing rise in public debt remains a concern. This is something we have been highlighting in previous Article IV’s, and it is important to note that it remains a major issue to be attentive to.
Good news, in 2025, the federal government deficit did decline. However, we believe that even though the fiscal changes put in place in 2025 will provide a modest near-term boost to activity in 2027, 2026-2027. They will also raise the deficit, and indeed what we expect is both federal and general government debt to go up, with the latter reaching 140 percent of GDP by 2030.
Putting public debt on a decisively downward path will require determined actions in line with Secretary Bessent’s views on lowering the federal deficit. We have some recommendations in this regard, considering a broad range of policies to raise tax revenues and address structural imbalances in programs such as Social Security and Medicare.
And let me go to fourth, say a few words about tariffs. We share the administration’s concern about the size of the U.S. trade and current account deficit. This imbalance needs to be addressed, and doing so will benefit the U.S. and it will benefit the global economy. We also recognize that more needs to be done to eliminate the various policy distortions in the U.S. and in other countries that have led to these high external imbalances, and we are advocating for urgent action on that. We have been talking about it, various venues.
In the U.S., though, tariffs have a negative supply effect, and this has added to goods inflation, as I just mentioned before, which has been a headwind to ever stronger growth. We could have seen more of the good news. Over the longer horizon, the tariffs distort resource allocation, and they wait on productivity. And this is the reason why we encourage the U.S. to work constructively with its trading partners to address these mutual concerns and agree on a coordinated reduction in distortions and trade restrictions that are adding to these global imbalances.
Now, let me make a point for the record. As you have seen in the concluding statement, we have not opined on the Supreme Court decision on tariffs, and there is a reason for that. Our standard practice is to finalize the concluding statement and share it with the authorities. This has happened for the U.S. on February 20, roughly a week before the publication today. So, what you got today, the authorities got a week ago, and we could not take the implications of that decision into account.
Now, this being said, we recognize these are important developments. We are digesting them. We will analyze their economic implications. We will be publishing the Staff Report for the United States Article IV several weeks from now and, of course, we will be publishing a new World Economic Outlook in mid-April. So, stay tuned, anticipate that there will be more on this topic at that time.
So let me conclude in the following way. The U.S. economy continues to deliver an impressive performance, and it has proven agile in adapting to shifting policies. The level of private sector-led investment and the degree of dynamism and innovation have been impressive. Productivity gains have been broad-based across a number of sectors, and this good news provides an important opportunity for the administration to address the long-standing fiscal imbalance, to further support private sector dynamism through well calibrated partners policies, and to work with trade partners to lessen trade distortions. So overall, a good year for the U.S. and an opportunity to do more.
Julie, back to you.
MS. KOZACK: Very good. So, we will now open the floor for questions. Please, when you’re called, give your name and your affiliation. And if you’re online, please make sure to turn on your camera and your microphone when, when and if called on.
All right, let’s open the floor. We’ll start with you.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Madam Georgieva. You did note some concern about the current account deficit of the U.S. Now, as you know, the Trump administration is switching to a different set of tariffs that are based on dealing with current account or balance of trade problems. So, I’m just wondering, does the U.S., currently in the IMF’s estimation, have a large and concerning current account deficit, you know, that, you know, would be in line with the language of this particular law? You know, does the U.S. have a balance of payments crisis?
And then furthermore, just asking you also about the fiscal trajectory of the U.S. Certainly, quite a bit above where Secretary Bessent wants it to be. He wants 3 percent deficits compared to GDP of the U.S. How much time does he have, and subsequent administrations have to sort of bring this U.S. fiscal trajectory into line before we get to a point where things are more prone to crisis? Thank you.
MS. GEORGIEVA: Thank you very much. Good to see you. To start with, your first question, we have a methodology to assess external positions of our members. And when we apply this methodology to the U.S., the conclusion is that the current account deficit is too big just to make it very simple for the audience. And that is recognized by the administration. It has to be addressed, and it is something that we at the Fund have been working for quite some time to analyze and provide some inputs. And actually, I’m going to ask in a second, Nigel, tell you a little bit more about it.
We do recognize the importance of the U.S. to take a path to reducing the debt and deficit. I talked about that. We are now looking, so you have, on one side, you have the current account deficit, which is too high, and then on the other side, you have the federal budget in deficit, and you have debt levels in the United States that have continued to grow.
The U.S. is a large economy. It, as I said, it has proven to be incredibly dynamic. Actually, it is the only advanced economy where we see consistently year after year, high productivity growth that drives high growth in the country. So, it is not an economy where this is an immediate pressing concern either. It is an immediate pressing concern to fix in year 2026, in year 2027. But yes, over time, our recommendation is and continues to be that significant efforts would be necessary. We talk about reducing the deficit in line with Secretary Bessent’s aspiration to bring it down to 3 percent. That would take attention to both raising revenues and managing expenditures.
And since we have the luxury of Nigel sitting right next to me, and Nigel has been how many years on —
MR. CHALK: Oh, I don’t want —
MS. GEORGIEVA: You don’t want to go there. But here is the person who can give you, who can provide you with more details in response to your question and to everybody here.
MR. CHALK: So, just to pick up on what Kristalina said. So, clearly, the U.S. current account deficit is too big. It’s not an immediate problem that needs to be solved tomorrow. It’s something that we think needs to be solved over the medium term to bring it down to more sustainable levels. And I would just draw the link between what Kristalina said on the fiscal and on the current account. One of the ways to bring the current account down is to address the fiscal problem. If they address the fiscal problem in the U.S., the U.S. fiscal savings will go down, and that automatically will help reduce the current account deficit.
The other thing that could be done in the U.S. And I think there’s some efforts to try and do this in the policy of the new administration, is to try and find ways to increase U.S. household savings. So that could be through more generous tax incentives, through retirement plans, saving incentives for education, for children. So, there’s some efforts to try and do some of that.
And then the third thing I would highlight, to bring down the U.S. current account deficit actually requires actions in countries outside of the U.S. And so, by those countries, I think as Kristalina said in the opening remarks, by addressing their imbalances, by addressing their distortions that are creating large current account surpluses in those countries will automatically help reduce the current account deficit in the U.S. as well.
So, it’s a very complicated thing. There’s multiple streams to it. But I think this is something that should be done over the medium term, and we’ll be pretty consistent over the years in making that case.
MS. KOZACK: Thank you. Let’s keep the floor open. We’ll go to the corner in the back.
QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Towards the end of the report, you mentioned the strong institutional framework that the U.S. has, and you mentioned that the existing institutional protections and resourcing of some of those institutions need to be respected and protected. I was wondering if you could just divulge a little bit more on that position and why you made it. You also mentioned three organizations. You mentioned Revenue Administration, Financial Oversight, and Economic Statistics. Why those three and why the decision to leave monetary policy out, given that there has been some issues raised about the independence of the Fed, too? Thank you.
MS. GEORGIEVA: So, we know from decades and decades of experience that strong institutions provide the foundation for good policy decisions, especially when it comes down to understanding what is going on in the economy, in other words, collecting data. And we at the Fund do a lot to support countries in that regard. Definitely, the importance of supervisory authorities to be able to do their job in a way that guarantees their effectiveness. And we know well that independent central banks perform a very important function to provide monetary policy guidance, set the interest rates at the right place, make sure that inflation is, well, expectations are well anchored.
So, we know that. And in fact, we recently did look into developments in emerging market economies, and it was very rewarding to see how much emerging markets have moved over the last decades in setting up institutions with the right skills and right mandates to do their job. So, in that sense, we do believe that it has been in the history of this country that strong institutions support growth. And in the future of this country, of course, that would continue to be the case.
So, we recognize, I’m actually going to ask Nigel, why didn’t — why did we list those three? Let’s see, what’s the answer? Actually, you gave me a great question to ask. I wish I had it this morning when we were doing the prep for today.
MR. CHALK: Okay, so two things. One, on the Fed, we do earlier on in the statement, under the monetary policy, we do recognize that it’s very important that the Fed’s monetary policy decisions remain independent, as they currently are, and very focused on maintaining their statutory framework.
We chose to separate the Fed and the U.S. government as different entities. On the U.S. government, we’ve seen a very significant reduction in federal employment. Around 15 percent of the federal workforce has been lost over the past year. We want to make sure that that doesn’t have an impact, as Kristalina said, on key functions like regulatory oversight, like statistics agencies.
Why those agencies in particular? In part, those are our natural counterparts. They’re the main economics agencies. But I think there’s also an aspect that — that revenue administration statistics agencies, I think in the U.S. and elsewhere, often are underfunded and very much create a very important public good that we feel should be invested in. So, we just wanted to make sure that that wasn’t going to be a casualty of the federal downsizing.
MS. GEORGIEVA: And of course, given the role of the U.S. dollar, the Fed is important for U.S. businesses and households. It is also important globally. It has significance for the world economy.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, let’s go, we’ll go to right here in the front.
QUESTIONER: Thank you so much, Managing Director. I would like to ask about a specific part of the report on immigration policies. The IMF notices that there’s an impact on job creation and on growth as well. I would like to ask first if you, as the IMF, has identified any specific sector that is suffering the most because of these immigration policies? And secondly, in your talks with U.S. authorities, did you have any specific feedback on this? Because, of course, this is a policy that the administration is leading. So, wondering if they have reached out with a different number or a different point of view. Thank you so much.
MS. GEORGIEVA: We look at the labor market in the aggregate, so we don’t have the attention to specific sectors. And when we look at the labor market on the aggregate, what we see is that demand for labor has gone somewhat down. At the same time also supply of labor has gone down. And that, in a sense, provides for labor market stability. Unemployment is, as I said, going towards around 4 percent, which is a good place for this indicator.
The U.S. administration looks at immigration also, both from the perspective of the economy and from the perspective of national security. And in that context, they are looking at illegal immigration as something that has relevance for national security. We look at that immediate issue strictly from the perspective of what is the balance of the labor market. And I can tell you that this time around, it’s more difficult to establish that because we simply don’t know.
When we look forward next year, the year after, whether as a result of increasing productivity, and we all recognize that artificial intelligence may have quite a lot to do with that. Perhaps demand for labor would go further down, maybe in some segments of the labor market more than in others. That needs to be ascertained. And then what does it mean in terms of what is happening in supply of labor? Would that be — will we see a point when this is stabilizing at a certain level? And would there be a good match between demand for skills and availability of those skills on the labor market? And that is for us, for the next year, for the next Article IV, a question we have to get more deeply into.
Nigel, you want to add something.
MR. CHALK: No, that’s good.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. We are quickly running out of time, so I’m going to take one more question.
QUESTIONER: Thank you for taking our question. I just wanted to follow up on the issue of trade restrictions. You know, you mentioned that the U.S. should work with partners to address concerns and seek a coordinated reduction in trade restrictions. How do you assess the administration’s latest move to impose new tariffs, which could go up to 15 percent for various partners? And in your talks with Secretary Bessent, you know, has he seemed open to this, the IMF’s call to narrowly implement restrictions like tariffs on national security grounds moving forward? Like how has the administration responded also to these — to these concerns?
MS. GEORGIEVA: So, when we look at the developments in trade, let me make two observations. The first one is that when tariffs were announced in April, that did create some anxiety globally and uncertainty among U.S. trading partners. Since then, there have been agreements reached on a bilateral level. And our understanding is that the intention of the administration is to keep that predictability created through agreements, bilateral agreements, to keep it active, to stay with it.
While the tariffs for U.S. partners for some of them have been more difficult because of high exposure to exporting the United States, for others they have been less of an issue because of lower exposure. We can now see that from the announced tariffs in April to what is being collected, it has been in the interest of countries a positive development. In other words, what was announced was around 23 percent. What is now being collected is more in the order of around 10 percent. And given that U.S. participation in exports and imports, with the size of the U.S. economy and the big domestic market, is somewhere around 13-14 percent of the U.S. GDP, that means that the impact is more moderate, more muted than in April was expected.
We have not yet been able to assess what would be the impact of moving towards a different legal foundation and therefore different tariffs. We don’t know what exactly the administration’s plans are. We don’t know how would the partners of the U.S. react. More likely than not, there would be some continuity. So, I’m not going to opine on what that may look like. What I would say is that we have seen around the world a fairly strong commitment to keep trading with us in a defined manner, and also countries to trade with each other. And even more, we have seen more bilateral and plurilateral agreements as a result.
My very simple message is that we have been trading as humanity for thousands of years. Trade is like water. You put an obstacle, it goes around it, and it is for a reason, because trade helps us to have globally better allocation of resources and as a result get better outcomes for people. So, we expect to see that there would be more clarity given by the administration, and we would see in our analysis, in the report a couple of weeks from now, and at the Spring Meetings, more to say.
MS. KOZACK: Very good.
MS. GEORGIEVA: Take one more. There was this gentleman here, I feel for him. He has been raising his hand.
MS. KOZACK: All right. Over to you.
QUESTIONER: Thank you so much. I have two questions, but let me ask —
MS. GEORGIEVA: So, I’d like to have a question, and you want two.
QUESTIONER: Anyway, I will ask two. So, first of all, about private debt. In February, we have seen that private household debt in the U.S. climbed to U.S. $18.8 trillion, which is a new record high. From your standpoint, are there any risks for transmitting this issue to the economic — to the economic activity, to the economic growth, et cetera, or is it normal in the U.S. to see constantly growing private household debt? And the second question, the U.S. President Donald Trump has already announced his plan to increase the defense budget in 2027 to U.S. $1.5 billion — trillion U.S. dollars. From the IMF standpoint, is there any fiscal space for it right now, or the growing of the U.S. government debt is the only way forward? Thank you so much.
MS. GEORGIEVA: So, to your first question, what we see in the United States in terms of the financial sector, both on the corporate front and in households, is a pretty good picture. We need to remember that there are two things in the U.S. One is how attractive the U.S. is for financial flows from other countries. Meaning that the fuel for growth in the U.S. is coming at a high octane, it is coming at a high level. And we don’t really see concerns around households being able to serve there that level, neither corporations in the U.S. What we need to recognize is then when you have a high level of employment, and you have a buoyant economy, productivity going up, that creates space for households to feel more comfortable to spend. You have a job, you earn money, you spend money.
To your second question, the U.S. is in a position to fund its spending, its government spending. We, however, do recommend that medium-term attention has to be paid to bring debt and deficit down. When you have investments from the public purse, they also generate spillover impact within the country, going back to the people that the private debt going up, more jobs, better-paying jobs, people spend more. And we need to remember that this also is good for the world as a whole because a U.S. that grows, has high productivity, grows rapidly, and has the ability to create more opportunities for others has a positive spillover effect for the rest of the world. This being said, please be careful. Look at the deficit and debt levels. Bring them down,
Nigel?
MR. CHALK: Yeah, so just an annotation on the private. So, you can’t just look at the private debt. You have to look at the whole balance sheet of the household sector. And they have a lot of assets that have appreciated in value both in the financial sector and in housing. If you look at their balance sheet as a whole, it looks pretty healthy.
However, there are some segments that we do concern about particularly. It’s not always the case that the ones with the assets and the ones with the debt of the same households. And I would just highlight too that student debt in this country is very high, and it creates a burden, and we see it impacting macro variables like consumption because people have that burden as a service. And then for lower-income households, we’re starting to see some strains in their indebtedness. Not anything, I think, particularly unusual for this position in the cycle and the economic cycle. But still, there’s some concerns that is becoming more difficult for that segment of the population.
MS. GEORGIEVA: Okay, very good. Burned a question for next time when we get together.
MS. KOZACK: All right, very good. I will now bring this press briefing to a close.
As indicated, we will be entering now the next phase of our U.S. Article IV, which is preparing the Staff Report for presentation to our Board, after which, of course, it will be published and made available to all of you. Thank you so much for joining us, and we wish you all a wonderful rest of your afternoon and evening.
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler
Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org
United States of America: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2026 Article IV Mission
February 25, 2026
A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.
The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.
Washington, DC – February 20, 2026:
U.S. policymakers have embarked on a systemic reorientation of the U.S. economy with the overarching goal to increase economic self-reliance and, in doing so, to boost the living standards of American workers. This has manifested in efforts to increase domestic manufacturing capacity; reduce the trade deficit and the U.S.’s reliance on foreign-produced goods; increase domestic energy output; reduce the reliance on unauthorized immigrant workers; and reduce the federal government’s role in the economy. The 2026 Article IV consultation focuses on the macroeconomic effects of the shift in policies undertaken in 2025 and their impact on the U.S., on trading partners, and on the global economy more broadly.
A Buoyant Economy
The U.S. economy has performed well in 2025, in line with staff’s January 2025 WEO forecast, albeit with a very different policy mix than was anticipated at the time those forecasts were made. Growth reached 2.2 percent (on a q4/q4 basis) in 2025, driven by continued strong productivity growth even though the government shutdown took a bite out of activity in the fourth quarter. PCE inflation moved sideways during the year with tariffs boosting goods inflation as services inflation continued to fall. Employment growth has slowed markedly. Despite this, labor markets remain close to full employment (with unemployment at 4.3 percent in January 2026). The inflow of foreign-born workers has fallen sharply while labor force participation of prime age workers rose. Financial conditions remained loose for much of the year with equity markets reaching all-time highs and corporate spreads falling close to all-time lows. The federal fiscal deficit fell from 6.3 percent of GDP in FY24 to 5.9 percent of GDP in FY25. The external position in 2025 was moderately weaker than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
Implications of Recent Policy Changes for the Outlook
Fiscal Policy. The tax and spending changes that were legislated in 2025 are expected, in the near term, to provide a modest boost to activity (adding around 0.75 percent to the level of GDP in 2026-27) and to raise the deficit by around 1½ percent of GDP. Much of this boost to activity comes from the more generous tax treatment of capital spending and a lower household income tax burden. However, from 2029 onwards, as some of these tax provisions expire and spending cuts grow, fiscal policy will tighten creating a net drag on growth.
Tariffs. Higher tariffs should modestly lower the trade deficit and raise around ¾ percent of GDP in revenue in the near term. They do, though, represent a negative supply shock to the U.S. economy which is expected to raise the PCE price index (by around ½ percent by early 2026) and reduce the level of output (by around ½ percent).
Immigration Policies. Stricter border enforcement and increased removals are expected to reduce the size of the foreign-born labor force in the coming years resulting in slower employment growth, a modest increase in inflationary pressures, and a reduction in activity of around 0.4 percent by 2027.
Deregulation. The new administration is undertaking a wholesale re-examination of the U.S. approach to regulation including by requiring that every new regulation be accompanied by the elimination of ten existing regulations. Steps to boost the energy sector—by making it easier to develop fossil fuel, geothermal, biofuel, nuclear and hydroelectric assets and tilting the relative incentives away from renewables and toward the production and consumption of higher carbon energy sources—has been a particular focus. Actions are also underway to recalibrate or eliminate certain financial regulatory requirements, tailor supervision to the underlying risk of the activity, and introduce a regulatory framework for digital assets. These measures should support greater economic dynamism. However, it is difficult at this point to quantify either the degree to which regulations have been loosened or the macroeconomic effects of these changes.
The Outlook
Incorporating the effects of the various policy changes outlined above, staff expect growth to accelerate in 2026 to around 2.4 percent (on a q4/q4 basis). The inflationary impulse from tariffs is expected to wane in the coming months, allowing core PCE inflation to fall back to 2 percent by early 2027. Risks to the near-term outlook for growth and inflation are seen as balanced (see below).
Employment is expected to grow at less than one-half of the pace seen in the five years prior to the pandemic. However, given the ongoing slowing of population growth, the unemployment rate should remain close to 4 percent in 2026-27. Staff has lowered its estimate of medium-term potential growth by ¼ percentage point (relative to the estimate at the time of the 2024 Article IV) with lower labor force growth expected to more-than-offset the gains in labor productivity.
The current account deficit is expected to decline modestly over the medium-term—to around 3½ percent of GDP—but remain well above levels prevailing prior to the pandemic. After having declined somewhat in 2025, the federal deficit is expected to exceed 6 percent of GDP in the next few years, and the federal debt-GDP ratio is expected to steadily increase over the medium term.
Near-Term Risks to Activity
There are potential upsides to the growth outlook arising from the ongoing and proposed deregulatory efforts which could further loosen financial conditions, spur investment, release supply constraints, and reduce energy costs. In addition, the surge in labor productivity seen over the past three years could endure, especially if technology adoption accelerates and the ongoing investments in infrastructure and intellectual property bear fruit.
There are two-sided risks from tariffs, taxes, and labor market dynamics. The passthrough of tariffs to consumer prices could be lower-than-expected (which would lead to a more front-loaded disinflation and better activity outturns). Alternatively, uncertainty around trade policies could represent a larger-than-expected drag on activity (particularly if the reconfiguration of supply chains proves difficult in the near-term). The effects of changes in corporate and personal income taxes and in spending could imply upside or downside risks to activity (given the wide range of multipliers estimated in the literature).
Finally, the uncertain path for the labor market creates two-sided risks. Higher labor force participation, smaller-than-expected reductions in overall immigrant inflows, or more sustained gains in labor productivity could allow for a higher level of activity. Alternatively, a more pronounced shortage of labor (particularly in sectors reliant on immigrant workers like agriculture and construction where productivity gains may be harder to achieve) could lead to sectoral disruptions and lower growth.
On the downside, if the promise of recent technology investments disappoints this could lead to tighter financial conditions, a weakening of aggregate demand, and more binding supply side constraints on activity.
Monetary Policy
With slowing job growth and few signs of second round effects from tariffs, it was appropriate for the Fed to remove monetary policy restraint during the course of 2025. Staff view risks to the Fed’s maximum employment and price stability mandate as balanced and see only modest scope to lower the policy rate over the coming year (i.e., to ensure the ex ante real federal funds rate remains broadly unchanged during the year).
Under staff’s baseline outlook, the federal funds rate would reach 3¼-3½ percent by end-2026 which should allow the economy to return to full employment and 2 percent inflation by early 2027. A larger monetary easing would need to be predicated on a material worsening in labor market prospects. As always, future changes in the policy rate will need to be attentive to incoming information. Continuing to clearly communicate the FOMC’s interpretation of incoming data should ensure that any needed shifts in the monetary stance are well understood and smoothly absorbed.
The Fed has rightly discontinued the runoff of its balance sheet, started to undertake reserve management purchases, and enhanced standing repo operations. Looking forward, the Fed’s predictable, periodic asset purchases should be geared to ensuring an ample level of bank reserves so as to mitigate potential volatility in money market conditions.
The Fed’s policy credibility represents a highly valuable asset which should be carefully guarded, including by ensuring the Fed’s monetary policy decisions remain independent and firmly focused on achieving its statutory mandate of price stability and maximum employment.
Fiscal Policy
Under current policies, the general government deficit is expected to remain in the 7-8 percent of GDP range, causing general government debt to reach 140 percent of GDP by 2031. While the risk of sovereign stress in the U.S. is low, the upward path for the public debt-GDP ratio and increasing levels of short-term debt-GDP represent a growing stability risk to the U.S. and global economy.
In addition to raising public debt, the recent changes in fiscal, trade and immigration policies will have important distributional effects. The reduced taxation of tips and overtime pay, combined with increases in the child tax credit, should boost household incomes.
However, staff models suggest that reductions in Medicaid and food assistance, combined with higher tariffs, will act in the opposite direction, resulting in materially lower real disposable incomes for the bottom third of the income distribution and an increase in the poverty rate. After 2029, when the more progressive income tax provisions are scheduled to expire, the combined effect of these policy changes is expected to lead to lower real disposable income for the bottom half of the income distribution.
A clear, frontloaded fiscal consolidation plan is needed to put debt-GDP on a downward trajectory. This will require a shift to a general government primary surplus of around 1 percent of GDP (an adjustment of around 4 percent of GDP relative to the current baseline). Achieving this needed realignment of the fiscal position will require going beyond the ongoing efforts to identify efficiencies in discretionary, non-defense federal spending (which makes up only 15 percent of total federal outlays). Rather, the bulk of this adjustment will need to be borne by increases in federal revenues and a rebalancing of entitlement programs (notably social security and Medicare). To protect poorer households and prevent a worsening of the income distribution, adjustments in the social safety net will also be needed. Reducing the fiscal deficit would not only serve to address debt sustainability concerns but would also facilitate a reduction in the current account imbalance.
Trade Policy
International trade has fostered growth, job creation, and resilience in both the U.S. and abroad. However, there is broad recognition that more needs to be done to increase supply chain resilience, to eliminate the various policy distortions—both in the U.S. and other countries—that have led to high external imbalances, and to ensure that the benefits of trade are broadly shared across society.
In this regard, higher tariffs create costs by distorting the allocation of productive resources, disrupting global supply chains, and undermining the benefits of global trade. The U.S. should work constructively with its trading partners to address concerns over unfair trade practices and agree on a coordinated reduction in trade restrictions and industrial policy distortions that have negative cross-border effects. Where trade and investment measures (including tariffs and export controls) are put in place for national security reasons, such policies should be applied narrowly, so as to minimize their negative effects at both home and abroad.
Financial Stability
As outlined in the 2024 Article IV consultation, there is a need to fully implement the final components of the Basel III agreement, apply similar regulatory requirements to all banks with US$100 billion or more in assets (including supervisory stress tests), further strengthen supervisory oversight and practices, re-examine the coverage of deposit insurance, and recalibrate bank liquidity requirements and liquidity stress tests.
Recent improvements in the clarity of treatment of stablecoins and other crypto-assets are welcome and should serve as a useful basis for future innovation in digital asset markets. Work is underway to develop a regulatory and supervisory framework for such assets and this will need to remain attentive to a range of potential new risks—including to financial integrity—posed by the integration of these digital assets into the existing bank and nonbank financial system.
External Imbalances
Despite the administration’s policy efforts, the U.S. current account deficit is expected to remain large in the coming years (at around 3½-4 percent of GDP). The U.S. negative net international investment position (NIIP) is also expected to continue widening due to nonresident inflows into U.S. risk assets and increased external borrowing by the general government. This worsening of the NIIP, alongside a shift in the nonresident investor base toward nonbank private investors, represents a potentially important source of vulnerability. An abrupt shift in portfolio preferences could lead to a disorderly external rebalancing. A substantial fiscal adjustment (discussed above), accompanied by a range of other policies to raise private saving, will be essential to reduce these vulnerabilities. Action by trading partners, to address distortions that contribute to external imbalances, will also be critical.
An Alternative Policy Mix
In staff’s view, a different set of policies could better achieve the administration’s goals without the negative outward spillovers of the current policy mix while facilitating a more favorable distributional outcome. This alternative policy path would include permanently applying full expensing to all corporate investment, replacing tariffs with a destination-based consumption tax, moving toward a skills-based immigration system with larger authorized immigrant inflows, providing tax incentives for private savings and to defray the cost of childcare, reducing the imbalances in Medicare and social security, eliminating a range of avenues for tax avoidance, increasing the generosity of the earned income tax credit, and better targeting the child tax credit. Together, this combination of policies would increase employment growth and labor force participation, support higher activity, put the public debt on a downward path, lower the trade and current account deficit, and reduce poverty.
The Institutional Framework for Economic Policymaking
The U.S.’s strong institutional framework for economic and regulatory policymaking should be maintained, including by respecting existing institutional protections and fully resourcing the agencies that are responsible for key federal functions (particularly revenue administration, financial oversight, and the provision of economic statistics).
Guyana reiterates commitment to US collaboration at First Americas Counter Cartel Summit
March 5, 2026
Guyana reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening regional security and cooperation with the United States (US) Government to counter narco-trafficking and other forms of transnational crime.
Prime Minister Brigadier (Ret’d) Mark Phillip is representing Guyana at the first “America Counter Cartel Conference” hosted by US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the US Southern Command in Miami, Florida. It was at this conference that he reinforced Guyana’s position. Prime Minister Phillips expressed appreciation to the US government and its Secretary of War for convening the meeting and inviting Guyana’s participation.
“Guyana and the United States share a strong and expanding strategic partnership built on mutual trust and robust defence and security cooperation through capacity building, joint exercises, and policy and technical engagements,” he said.
Both nations worked closely to combat transnational crimes, as criminal networks involving cartels, gangs, and other organised groups pose a serious threat to peace and security across the region.
With Guyana’s geographic position along major maritime and regional transit corridors, he said the fight against narco-trafficking and narco-terrorism is extremely important. Because of these factors, the prime minister stressed the need for strong cooperation among countries in the region to address these threats effectively.
All collaborative efforts must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each participating state. As economic and strategic growth continues through the region, “It is also essential that we work together to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen national institutions, and enhance our resilience to evolving security threats.”
Guyana welcomed the adoption of a Joint Security Declaration aimed at strengthening hemispheric cooperation against organised crime and narco-terrorism. Prime Minister Phillips signalled that Guyana intends to join the coalition and pledged continued support for regional security initiatives. He reinforced Guyana’s commitment to acting as a reliable and active partner in advancing peace, security, and stability across the Western Hemisphere.
On Saturday, Guyana President Dr Irfaan Ali spoke favourably about President Trump, saying that while many conversations discuss crime and security in the region, the US President is now taking direct action.
Guyana – Venezuela: nothing changed despite ouster of Maduro
February 26, 2026 Greg Quinn
Since the capture of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela by US forces on 03 January 2026 there has been nothing short of an outpouring of joy in both Guyana and elsewhere about how this changes the dynamic of the bilateral relationship. The belief of such folks is that we are now in a different place in terms of Venezuela’s claims on two-thirds of Guyanese territory; that we can pretend such a claim doesn’t exist; and that the US will ensure nothing happens to cause problems.
I’m sorry but I’m calling this out for the rubbish this is. Why?Venezuela has not changed. The folks who supported Maduro when he was President are still in charge – and they have not changed their opinions.
For example Delcy Rodriguez, the Acting President, wore a pin at her inauguration that included all of Essequibo that Venezuela claims. The leaders of Venezuela have not changed their tune simply because there has been a change at the top. How could they?
The claim to Essequibo is drilled into every Venezuelan from a young age. The iniquities of the British in manipulating the 1899 Arbitral Award are all but law there. You don’t forget this overnight. Any more than any Guyanese would forget that Essequibo belongs to it (to be clear it does), nor that the New River Triangle is also Guyanese (to be clear it is).So why should anyone believe that Venezuela would change its position because its brutal dictator was replaced by the woman who was his right-hand?
The Venezuelan’s aren’t even trying to pretend otherwise. On 24 February Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Yvan Gil, said: ‘It has been clearly demonstrated that the path chosen by the Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana – a unilateral path – is unworkable, illegal and illegitimate, a path that does not reflect the spirit of the Geneva Agreement signed between the parties.’
Literally every word of that statement is wrong, and it doesn’t sound much of a change in position to me.He went on to say:‘The peoples of Guyana and Venezuela are certain we will find a solution, a definition to this controversy through a mechanism of direct consultation, as mandated by this agreement, whose 60th we celebrate today and which we hope will be the solution sooner rather than later.’
There we get to the nub of the Vene-zuelan position. That they want a new bilateral negotiation to settle the controversy. But there is nothing to negotiate. The border was settled in 1899 and the 1966 Geneva Agreement does nothing to suggest that the border was invalid or wrong.
Its purpose was to look at the Venezuelan claim that the 1899 Award was ‘null and void’. But nothing has ever been found to suggest the 1899 Award was null and void, despite everyone looking, and therefore there is nothing to suggest there are grounds for renegotiation.Guyana must therefore be careful about falling into the trap of discussions.
The Venezuelans will use any suggestion of these (as they did with the December 2023 Argyle Agreement) as validation for its position. Let me be clear again on this. The Venezuelan claim has no grounds in fact or legality. Indeed, it is Guyana who has the claim as Venezuela continues to illegally occupy half of Ankoko Island.
Ultimately a country’s foreign policy has to be decided on reality and what is being said. Not wishful thinking. Similarly, people have to look at what is being said rather than hoping for the best. And what is being said out of Caracas is not good news for Guyana.
There is no new position. The sooner people realise that the better. Of course the game-changer could be the US approach. But I doubt how much impact US pressure could have on this particular internal issue which unites every Venezuelan.
And, frankly speaking, with President Trump in charge who knows what position the US will take today, never mind tomorrow.
Greg Quinn OBE is a former British Diplomat who served in Estonia, Ghana, Belarus, Iraq, Washington DC (seconded to State Department), Kazakhstan, Guyana ( High Commissioner), Suriname ( Ambassador), The Bahamas ( High Commissioner), Canada ( Consul General Toronto and Calgary), and Antigua and Barbuda ( resident British Commissioner) in addition to stints in London. He now runs his own government relations, business development and crisis management consultancy: Aodhan Consultancy Ltd (www.aodhaninc.co.uk).
PM Persad-Bissessar Heads To US For High-Level Shield Of The Americas Summit
March 5, 2026 Sunil Lalla
Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar SC will depart Trinidad &Tobago on Friday for the Shield of the Americas Summit in Florida, following an official invitation from US President Donald Trump.
Trinidad & Tobago is one of only two CARICOM states invited to the high-level event. At Thursday’s Post Cabinet Media Briefing, Minister Nicholas Morris confirmed that she is expected to engage directly with senior US officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and described the visit as a significant diplomatic opening, underscoring the current strength of the relationship between Port of Spain and Washington.
“The Prime Minister will have an opportunity for dialogue with the President of the United States, as well as senior officials, including the Secretary of State, Mr. Marco Rubio, United States Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer and Secretary of Energy, Chris Wright. .
The delegation of the Prime Minister includes Minister Sean Sobers, Minister Barry Padarath and myself (Sunil Lalla). This is an opportunity for the Prime Minister to continue the relationship and cooperation with the United States and this is the strongest our relationship with the United States has been.
The Prime Minister, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, requested bilateral discussions with some of our colleagues, namely the Presidents of Argentina, Panama, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. So it is a very big opportunity for Trinidad & Tobago to continue our fight on the regional, on the international stage, to bring opportunity back to the Trinidad &Tobago.”
Minister of Works Jearlean John, will act as Prime Minister during Mrs. Persad-Bissessar’s absence.
Becoming part of Mercosur would benefit T&T
March 7, 2026
Membership in the South American trade bloc Mercosur ( Spanish Mercado Común del Sur, or Southern Common Market) could bring significant benefits for Trinidad and Tobago, according to Foreign Minister Sean Sobers. Mercosur promotes free trade, economic integration and cooperation among member states
Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said earlier this week that while T&T would maintain ties with the Caribbean Community (Caricom), it also intends to expand relations with other nations. T&T has applied for membership in Mercosur . Sobers confirmed that T&T submitted an application to Paraguay’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its capacity as Pro Tempore president of Mercosur.
The Prime Minister is expected to engage in bilateral talks with the President of Paraguay on this issue and other matters during the Shield of the Americas Summit at the Trump National Doral Miami in Doral today. T&T trades with all regions of the world. However, its exports are skewed toward North America, Caricom and Europe, which collectively account for about 69% of total exports. North America and Asia accounts for over 67% of total imports.
Trade with South America, accounting for about 8 per cent of total exports and 10 per cent of total imports—can be significantly enhanced, given the size of the South American market. Mercosur population is about 308 million people and their combined gross domestic product is US$3 trillion.
In 2024, T&T exports to Mercosur amounted to $2,003,868,096, while imports were valued at $3,380,037,289. Trade with Brazil accounted for the majority of Mercosur–Trinidad and Tobago trade. Although the Mercosur market is significantly larger, T&T has a strong manufacturing base with several internationally competitive products that could succeed in South America.
Mercosur presents both a potential export market and an attractive source of investment and technology for T&T. Beyond the trade in goods, an agreement with Mercosur could provide a platform for increased trade in services, particularly tourism, cultural, financial and ICT services, as well as the promotion of investment. The Associated States of Mercosur are members of the Latin American Integration Association with which Mercosur has free trade agreements and which subsequently request to be recognised as associate members.
This currently includes Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru. Associate states may also include countries with which Mercosur signs agreements under Article 25 of the Treaty of Montevideo, which allows for agreements with other states or economic integration areas in Latin America. This is the case for Guyana and Suriname. Associated states are authorised to participate in meetings of Mercosur bodies that address issues of common interest.
Cabinet approved the ministry’s recommendation that Trinidad and Tobago pursue a dual strategy of associate membership in Mercosur while negotiating a Partial Scope Trade Agreement with the bloc along the lines of one recently concluded with Chile.The Trinidad and Tobago–Chile Partial Scope Trade Agreement provides access to the Chilean market for 267 products from T&T—including exports such as methanol, ammonia, urea and LNG—while allowing reduced tariffs on 151 products from Chile.